PAOK's Tactical Mastery in 2-0 Victory Over Dynamo Kyiv
PAOK’s 2-0 win over Dynamo Kyiv at Toumba Stadium in the UEFA Europa League 2nd Qualifying Round was built on structural clarity and superior use of a shared 4-2-3-1 template. Both sides lined up in the same base shape, but PAOK manipulated the spaces between the lines far better, with G. Konstantelias the decisive figure as a roaming No.10 and the main reference point for the home side’s attacking scheme.
Alessio Lisci’s 4-2-3-1 for PAOK was highly positional. The back four of Jogo, G. Michailidis, P. Hatzidiakos and J. Kenny provided a stable, relatively flat platform, with B. Santamaria and C. Zafeiris as the double pivot. Their job was less about vertical risk and more about ensuring PAOK could keep circulation clean and prevent Dynamo from attacking directly through the middle. Ahead of them, the trio of Taison (left), G. Konstantelias (central) and A. Zivkovic (right) constantly rotated around A. Mythou as the lone striker.
First Key Tactical Pattern
The first key tactical pattern was how PAOK used their left side. Jogo held the width, while G. Michailidis often stepped slightly higher and narrower from left centre-back, creating a three-plus-one structure in the first phase with Santamaria dropping. This allowed Konstantelias to drift into the left half-space, pulling Dynamo’s right-sided midfielder and full-back into awkward decisions: step out and leave Mythou 1v1 centrally, or hold the line and concede free receptions between the lines. The 45' opener, finished by G. Konstantelias and assisted by Jogo, encapsulated this: PAOK progressed down the flank, then exploited the interior gap as Dynamo’s back four were pinned horizontally.
Dynamo Kyiv, under Igor Kostyuk, mirrored the 4-2-3-1 but with less fluidity. V. Brazhko and J. Lonwijk formed the double pivot, with V. Buyalskyy nominally as the No.10 behind M. Ponomarenko. On paper this gave them enough central presence, but in practice the pivots were often pinned too deep by PAOK’s high positioning of Taison and Zivkovic, forcing Dynamo to build either with flat passes across the back four or direct balls into Ponomarenko. Without consistent support runs from N. Voloshyn and B. Redushko (from the right and left respectively), those direct balls were easy for Hatzidiakos and Michailidis to manage.
Second Goal
The 48' second goal again by G. Konstantelias, this time assisted by G. Michailidis, underlined PAOK’s control of the half-spaces. Early in the second half, PAOK immediately targeted Dynamo’s right channel. Michailidis’ involvement as provider reflected how the left centre-back was encouraged to step into midfield when the pivot pair held their positions. With Dynamo’s block still adjusting after the interval, Konstantelias found the seam between right centre-back T. Kedziora and right-back O. Sych, timing his run to meet the pass and effectively end the contest.
Discipline Events
Discipline events further highlighted the territorial story. P. Hatzidiakos’ 35' yellow card for “Tripping” was the result of PAOK defending high, with the centre-back forced into an aggressive intervention to stop a rare Dynamo transition. By contrast, Dynamo’s bookings came later and deeper: M. Ponomarenko’s 50' yellow for “Tripping” and M. Shaparenko’s 78' yellow for “Foul” reflected a chasing side trying to disrupt PAOK’s rhythm rather than contesting territory on equal terms. The card profile (PAOK: 1 yellow; Dynamo Kyiv: 2 yellows; Total: 3) fits a game where the home team controlled tempo and the visitors increasingly resorted to reactive challenges.
Substitutions
Substitutions from both coaches were clearly tactical rather than merely fitness-based. At 67', with the score already 2-0, Kostyuk tried to inject creativity and experience: A. Yarmolenko (IN) came on for N. Voloshyn (OUT), and M. Shaparenko (IN) came on for V. Buyalskyy (OUT). The idea was to add a left-footed playmaker and a more composed central connector, potentially switching the creative hub from the initial No.10 to deeper zones. However, PAOK’s compact 4-4-1-1 out of possession, with Konstantelias dropping alongside Santamaria and Zafeiris, denied them central progression.
Lisci’s response was proactive game management. At 69', D. Chatsidis (IN) came on for Taison (OUT), adding fresher legs and more defensive reliability on the flank to protect the two-goal cushion. The triple change at 76' was a structural lock: A. Baba (IN) came on for A. Zivkovic (OUT), A. Elustondo (IN) came on for P. Hatzidiakos (OUT), and M. Camara (IN) came on for C. Zafeiris (OUT). Baba’s introduction shifted PAOK closer to a back five in the last line when needed, Elustondo brought fresh aerial presence and aggression, and Camara added ball-carrying capacity in midfield to relieve pressure and draw fouls.
On Dynamo’s side, V. Kabaev (IN) came on for B. Redushko (OUT) at 80', an attempt to add directness and 1v1 threat on the flank, while K. Bilovar (IN) replaced A. Thiare (OUT) and P. Mounguengue (IN) replaced J. Lonwijk (OUT) at 86'. Those late changes tilted the side slightly more attacking, but by then PAOK’s block was entrenched and the match state favoured the home side’s conservative posture. Finally, at 83', D. Pelkas (IN) came on for G. Konstantelias (OUT), a like-for-like swap that maintained the No.10 structure but with a more possession-oriented profile to close the game.
From a statistical perspective, many key metrics such as shots, possession, passes, xG, goalkeeper saves and goals prevented are not provided, so the tactical reading must lean heavily on structure, event timing and substitutions. The half-time score of 1-0, followed by an immediate 48' strike to make it 2-0, shows PAOK’s ability to score at psychologically important moments: just before and just after the interval. Dynamo’s inability to respond, even after introducing senior figures like Yarmolenko and Shaparenko, suggests that PAOK’s positional discipline and compact mid-block effectively neutralised any qualitative edge the visitors hoped to gain from the bench.
Overall, PAOK’s 4-2-3-1 was the more coherent version of the shared system. Their superior occupation of the half-spaces, intelligent full-back usage on the left, and well-timed in-game adjustments turned structural parity on paper into clear superiority on the pitch, delivering a controlled 2-0 home win at Toumba Stadium.
